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NATURALLY CONFUSING CONSUMERS: EXPRESs FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE CLAIMS REGARDING FALSE AND
MISLEADING FOOD PRODUCT LABELS
TARYN M. DEVEAU
I. INTRODUCTION
When choosing a box of cereal at the grocery store, consumers are
bombarded with food product packaging proclaiming its contents "all
natural," "whole grain," "good source of calcium," and the like. Many
consumers rely on these claims to make informed decisions conceming
their diets. In the midst of the current obesity epidemic, consumers have
become increasingly conscious of eating nutritious food.' About two-thirds
of American adults are overweight, and a study by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) found the health-care cost of obesity is
approximately $147 billion annually.2 According to the Center for Science
in the Public Interest, nutrition and health information such as food productlabeling information could help lower the obesity rate.3 Food companies
benefit from consumers confusing foods labeled "natural" with those
labeled "organic." 4 Organic foods have specific United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) certifying criteria, whereas "Natural" food labeling
laws are non-existent and foods with a "natural" label are generally
misleading. 5 Consumers' health conscious craze has created a $22.3 billion
market for foods labeled as "Natural," causing an increase in class action
lawsuits claiming such food labeling is false and misleading.6 Foods such as
Snapple, Healthy Choice pasta sauce, Skinnygirl Cocktails, Ben and Jerry's

. Executive Editor of the KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL

RESOURCES LAW 2012-2013; B.B.A. 2010 University of Kentucky; J.D. expected May 2013, University
of Kentucky.
1 BRUCE SILVERGLADE & ILENE RINGEL HELLER, CTR. FOR SC. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
FOOD LABELING CHAOS: THE CASE FOR REFORM (2010) [hereinafter FOODLABELING CHAOS], available

at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/food labeling chaos report.pdf
2 Id. at 1-i1.
3
id
4 Major Agribusiness Competing with Organics on the Cheap, "Natural"Food Products
with Toxic Chemicals and GMOs Deceiving Consumers, CORNUCOPIA INST. (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.cornucopia.org/20 11/10/cerealcrimes-pressrelease.
5 id.
6 "Natural" Beats "Organic" in Food Sales According to Nielsen's Healthy Eating Report,

NILSENwIRE (Jan. 21, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/"natural"-beats-"orgaic"-in-foodsales-according-to-nielsen's-healthy-eating-report/; Ashby Jones, Is Your Dinner 'All Natural'? WALL ST. J.
(Sep. 20,2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903374004576580671156407598.html.
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ice cream, and Wesson cooking oils have all had their "Natural" status
questioned.'
It may seem more likely that Kellogg's Froot Loops and General
Mills' Trix cereals are falsely claiming to be "Natural," but cereals with a
healthier reputation, like Kashi, confuse consumers with their food label
claims as well. A recent lawsuit filed against Kashi and its parent
company, Kellogg, claims that Kashi's labels are intentionally misleading
because the labels contain synthetic and unnaturally processed ingredients. 9
Specifically, the plaintiff claims Kashi added "synthetic substances listed as
prescription drugs to its foods, irradiated substances, pesticides that are a
by-product of uranium mining, and federally declared hazardous
substances." 0 Kashi's brand image is centered around a healthy and ecofriendly lifestyle, and the company uses its website to educate consumers
about natural food ingredients, organic farming, and the environment." The
District Court for the Southern District of California concluded that the
plaintiffs claims were not expressly preempted because the "[d]efendants
did not specify which subsection of [21 U.S.C.] § 343 would be violated,
and because there is no subsection of section 343 listed under section 3431(a) that addresses labeling food items as 'natural."'l 2 The lawsuit against
Kashi is an example that illustrates the framework courts should apply
when deciding whether a "natural" food-labeling claim is expressly
preempted.
The increase in litigation surrounding "natural" food product
labeling has stemmed largely from the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) failure to adequately define the term "natural."' In 1991, the FDA
considered defining the term to mean "nothing artificial or synthetic
(including colors regardless of source) is included in, or has been added to,
the product that would not normally be expected to be there."' 4 However, in
1993, the FDA refused to adopt a formal definition of the term or prohibit

See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 333 (3rd Cir. 2009); See also
Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Jones, supra note 6.
Bonnie Rochman, The Sugary Brands Doing the Most Kid-Chasing, TIME MAG. (Oct. 23,
2009),
http://www.time.com/timelspecials/packages/article/0,28804,1931891_1931889_1931887,00.html
(showing cereal box contains "Natural" food labeling claim).
9 Bates v. Kashi, No. 3:1 1-cv-01 967-H-BGS, 2011 WL 3821651 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011).
oId 2.
" Id. 6.
SId. 6-7.
13 Jones, supra note 6; See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 333(3rd Cir.
2009); See also April L. Farris, The "Natural"Aversion: The FDA's Reluctance to Define a Leading
Food-Inductry Marketing Claim, and the Pressing Need for a Workable Rule, 65 Food Drug L.J. 403
(2010).
" Holk, 575 F.3d at 340 (quoting Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, 55 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27,1991)).
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its use."s Currently, the FDA's informal policy is still in place, allowing use
of the term unless the food contains added color, artificial flavors, or
synthetic substances. On November 16, 2011, the FDA issued a warning
letter to a potato company stating the food label may be misleading because
the food product contains a synthetic preservative." The warning letter
included the FDA's informal policy definition, indicating the likelihood that
this is the preferred definition of the term.18 As a result of the FDA failing
to define the term and enforce an official "natural" food labeling policy,
courts have found that federal law does not preempt state law claims based
on false and misleading labeling.' 9
Overall, recent cases have failed to find preemption for various
unclear reasons.20 In order to ensure more uniformity in the food product
labeling express preemption analysis, courts should follow a two-step
approach similar to the analysis the U.S. Supreme Court used in Riegel v.
Medtronic concerning medical devices. First, courts should analyze the
level of premarket approval and FDA regulations to determine whether
there is a federal "requirement." Second, courts should compare the federal
"requirement" to the state claim to determine whether they are "identical."
Additionally, states may provide a cause of action based on an "identical"
state law, and those claims would not be preempted.
The first part of this note explains the defense of federal
preemption generally. The second part summarizes and explains the current
status of the law concerning "natural" food product labeling cases and
related lawsuits. The third part discusses recent U.S. Supreme Court cases
concerning federal preemption under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, (FDCA), regarding medical devices and prescription drugs. The fourth
part analyzes the current FDA regulations regarding food labeling and
determines whether they could be expressly preempted. Lastly, the fifth part
explains the impact of the current food labeling laws on consumer behavior.

" Holk, 575 F.3d at 340-41 (citing Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms: Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty
Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg 2,302, 2,397, 2,407 (Jan. 6, 1993)).
1 FDA Basics: What is the Meaning of Natural' on the Label ofFood?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214868.htm (last updated Apr. 4,
2012).
" Litigation Law Alert: "All Natural" Class Action Litigation in Cahforniaand What's In
Storefor 2012?,
STOLE RIVES LLP (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show-8971.
18 id.
'9 E.g., Holk, 575 F.3d at 339.
20 See id. at 339 (finding the claim was not impliedly preempted because the FDA
has not
officially defined the term); Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(failing to find the claims expressly preempted because the claims did not allege artificial ingredients).
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II. THE DEFENSE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION GENERALLY
Litigation involving "natural" food product labeling claims over the
past few years has largely turned on the issue of federal preemption. 2'
Federal preemption originates in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.2 2 Federal law preempts, or supersedes, state law when any of
three types of preemption is found.23 The three types of preemption are
express preemption, field preemption, and implied conflict preemption.2 4
Preemption analysis focuses on determining Congress' intent.25 In
areas traditionally regulated by the states, federal law is presumed not to
preempt state law unless "Congress has made such an intention clear and
manifest." 2 6 Even though food and beverage labeling has been regulated by
the federal government for over 100 years, it is within the states' police
powers, and therefore, within the traditional area of state regulation. 2 7
Accordingly, the presumption against preemption applies. 2 8 It is well
accepted that federal agency action may have the force of federal law for
preemption purposes, so regulations could preempt state law. 29
The FDCA prohibits misbranded food, and a food label is
considered misbranded if it is false or misleading. 30 A food is also
considered misbranded if "it bears or contains any artificial flavoring,
artificial coloring, or chemical preservative unless it bears labeling stating
that fact." ' The presence of a color additive must also be disclosed.32 The
FDCA does not provide a private right of action; rather the FDCA is
enforced through FDA administrative proceedings.3 3 The Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act, (NLEA), of 1990 was added to ensure
consistency with a national standard and to preclude states from adopting
inconsistent requirements.3 4 The NLEA contains an express preemption
provision, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1, providing that states must not have food
21 See, e.g., Holk, 575 F.3d at 340-41 (finding the claim was
not impliedly preempted
because the FDA has not officially defined the term); See also, e.g., Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1031
(failing to find
22 the claims expressly preempted because the claims did not allege artificial ingredients).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23Holk, 575 F.3d at 334.
24 Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1476 (2005); In re Farm Raised
Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1177 (Cal. 2008).
25 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (stating that "the
purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touch-stone" in preemption analysis (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1652 v.
Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
26 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431,
449 (2005).
2278 Holk, 575 F.3d at 334-35.
d
29Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
'o 21 U.S.C. § 33 1(b) (2011); 21U.S.C. § 343(a) (2011).
3 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(k) (2011).

32 Id.

33Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
34In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2008).
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labeling requirements that are not "identical" to the FDCA." "Not
identical" has been applied to state requirements that "(1) are not imposed
by or contained in the applicable provision [or regulation]; or (2) differ
from those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable provision
[or regulation]."36 The express preemption provision applies to specific
provisions such as those for artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or
chemical preservatives, and also applies to health and nutrient content
claims. 37
III. RECENT FOOD LABELING CASES REGARDING THE FEDERAL
PREEMPTION DEFENSE

A. Express Preemption Under § 343-1(a) of the NutritionLabeling and
EducationAct
Express preemption requires Congress to expressly state its intent
to preempt state law.38 Generally, when a manufacturer is in compliance
with FDA regulations, courts are more willing to find the claims preempted.
In In re FerreroLitigation, the plaintiff alleged the defendant "deceptively
omitted" the fact that Nutella contains artificial flavoring.39 The court found
§ 343(k) expressly preempted this claim because the label complies with
the disclosure requirement by listing the artificial flavor.40 In Lockwood v.
Conagra Foods, the court found § 343(k) did not expressly preempt the
claims because they did not allege artificial ingredients.41 Instead, the
plaintiffs alleged the defendant's "Healthy Choice" pasta sauce was not "all
natural" because it contained high fructose corn syrup rather than alleging
that it contained artificial flavoring, coloring, or a chemical preservative. 42
The court's analysis suggests a claim based on the failure to disclose
artificial flavoring or coloring may be preempted, but a claim simply
alleging that a food product is not "all natural" because it contains artificial
ingredients would not be preempted.
In In re PepsiCo., the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants
fraudulently misrepresented the source of Aquafina water by indicating the
water came from mountain sources, when it in fact was public drinking
water. The court ruled that these claims were expressly preempted by 21

" 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(1) (2011).
36 In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing
21 C.F.R.
§ 100.1(c)(4) (2012)).
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3)-(5) (2011) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(k), (q), (r) (2011)).
38 Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1476 (2005).
39
1n re FerreroLitig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 114.
40 id.
41
42

Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
id.
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U.S.C. § 343(r).4 3 Under 21 C.F.R. § 165.110(a)(3)(ii), manufacturers of
purified water are not required to disclose the source of the water." The
court first analyzed the FDCA's labeling requirement and then compared
the plaintiffs' state law cause of action to determine if the state claim
imposed a requirement that was not "identical" to federal law.45 The court
noted that state law causes of action are preempted if they "impose a
broader obligation."" The court found the plaintiffs' claims were not
identical to federal law because there is a regulation concerning the
municipal source of bottled water and Aquafina was in compliance with
that regulation.47 The court noted that subject matter lacking specific FDA
regulations would not be preempted.4 8
The court in Mills v. Giant of Md. LLC found the plaintiffs' claims,
that defendants' milk did not contain adequate warnings on the labels, were
expressly preempted under § 343-1(a)(1). 4 9 Under § 343-1(a)(1), no state
may establish a requirement that is the "subject of a standard of identity"
that is not identical to such standard or to the requirements in § 343(g).50
When a food is misbranded, § 343(g) applies because the food does not
contain all of the requirements in the "standard of identity," which is
different from claims regarding additions to the food product's "standard of
identity." 5 ' The FDA has the power to create a "reasonable definition and
standard of identity."5 2 Milk is subject to a "standard of identity" under 21
C.F.R. § 131, and the plaintiffs' sought to impose additional requirements
through the added warning labels. The court stated "a product subject to 'a
standard of identity' has a carefully delineated list of information that must
appear on its label." 54
In Yumul v. Smart Balance, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants'
nutrient content claims such as "No Cholesterol" and "healthy" were false
and misleading.ss The court found the claims were expressly preempted by
§ 343(r) because they imposed a requirement that was not "identical" to
federal law by forbidding a manufacturer from labeling its food products in

43In re Pepsico, Inc., Bottled Water Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
4 Id. at 536-37.
4
1 d. at 536.
Id. at 534.
47
Id. at 537.
48 Id. at 538 n.10.
4 Mills v. Giant of Md., L.L.C, 441 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.C. 2006).
0
Id. at 106.
"Id at 108 n.5.
52 Id. at 107 n.4.

* Id. at 106 n.4.
M Id at 108.
ss Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. 10-00927 MMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109952, at *7
(D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011).
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a way that complied with FDA regulations. In Turek v. GeneralMills, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to disclose that their food
products contained "non-natural" fibers.57 The court found that the
plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted by § 343(r) and § 343(q). In
Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., the court found that the
plaintiffs' claims, that the label was false and misleading because the
product was not "all natural," were not expressly preempted by § 343(r)
because there is no regulation defining the term "natural."s9
B. Express ParallelClaim Exception
The court in Thomas Mason v. Coca-Cola acknowledged a parallel
claim exception to express preemption when a plaintiff alleges a claim
under state law based on the failure to follow federal labeling regulations.60
The Supreme Court of California, in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, also
stated that Congress did not expressly preempt private claims based on state
laws with "identical" requirements to the FDCA.6 1 Therefore, it appears a
plaintiff may make a claim under state law that is based on either federal
law or an "identical" state law.
In In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants failed to disclose the presence of artificial coloring in their
farmed salmon.62 Under California law, private parties may assert unfair
competition law causes of action based on violations of the state's Sherman
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law.63 The California Supreme Court found by
negative implication that states may regulate color additives if the state's
regulations are "identical" to § 343(k).6 The court found the state's
Sherman Law provision regarding the use of color additives was "identical"
to § 343(k), thereby satisfying the parallel claim exception to express
65
preemption. The court noted that even if the wording had not been
identical, the Sherman Law incorporates all of the FDA's regulations. 66
Under In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases' analysis, state claims regarding
foods labeled "natural," that do not disclose the presence of artificial
coloring, would be preempted only if the claims were not "identical" to a
6 Id. at *34-37.
5

Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 956, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010).

" Id. at 960-62.
5 Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., No. C 10-4387, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57348,
at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).
60 Mason v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09-0220-NLH-JS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65107, at *8 (D.
N.J. June 30, 2010).
61 In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1177 (Cal. 2008).
62 Id. at 1173.
3
Id. at 1174 n.5.
64
Id. at 1175
6
1 Id. at 1178.
66 id.

126

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 5 No. 1

specific FDA regulation. If the claims are based on state law that is not
identical to federal requirements, then § 343-1 would expressly preempt
those claims.
To ensure consistency in food labeling express preemption
analysis, courts should follow the analysis applied to the FDCA by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Riegel v. Medtronic. Some cases have followed U.S.
Supreme Court preemption analysis that was not based on the FDCA. The
court in Turek applied the "Bates test," used by the U.S. Supreme Court to
determine the preemptive effect of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), to determine the preemptive scope of the
NLEA. Other courts have followed the analysis from medical device and
prescription drug cases that are not the most recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in the area. 68
C. Implied Preemption Generally
Implied preemption is analyzed "in the absence of anything
Congress said or even thought about."69 In In re Ferrero litigation, the
court noted "the NLEA states that it 'shall not be construed to preempt any
provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly preempted under
[21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)] of the [FDCA]."70 Courts have analyzed this section
in different ways. Some courts have found the statement to mean only
express preemption is possible. The California Supreme Court stated the
"preemptive scope" of § 343-1 was only intended to cover "the plain
language of the statute itself."7 1 The In re PepsiCo court found implied
preemption is not excluded, but the NLEA's rule of construction "refers to
the express preemption provision of Section 403A solely for the purpose of
exempting it." 7 2 In Red v. Kraft Foods, the court found the In re PepsiCo
court's interpretation "somewhat odd."7 3 The court in Holk found it is
possible to find implied preemption based on "provisions of federal law
other than the NLEA." 74

67Turek v. Gen. Mills Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 956, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
68See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1175; see also Turek, 754 F. Supp. 2d at

958.
69 Living on the Point of the Spear, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/09/living-on-point-of-spear.html.
70
In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
7 In re Farm RaisedSalmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1178-79.
72In re PepsiCo, Inc., 588 F. Supp.2d 527, 533 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
7 Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
7 Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F. 3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009).
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D. Implied Field Preemption
Field preemption is found where the federal regulation is "so
pervasive" that Congressional intent to "dominate the field" may be
inferred. The court in Lockwood v. ConagraFoods, Inc. stated the NLEA
included a preemption provision allowing identical state regulations,
indicating Congress considered state regulation and enforcement alongside
federal regulation.76 The Lockwood court noted the FDA has a policy
defining the word "natural" rather than a legal requirement, which shows
the FDA did not intend to occupy the field. The FDA's policy is an
advisory opinion used to show acceptable standards, but it is not a legal
requirement.7 8 The Lockwood court found that Holk's decision, which is
discussed below, was "neither binding nor persuasive."
E. Implied Conflict Preemption
1. Preemption with Undefined Terms: Natural Claims
Conflict preemption occurs when federal and state law conflict to
make compliance with both impossible.80 In Holk, plaintiffs alleged
Snapple's beverage products were not "all natural" because they contained
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). 8 ' The court found the claims against
Snapple were not impliedly preempted because the FDA has not officially
defined the term.82 The FDA's informal policy statements on the definition
of "natural" and FDA warning letters were not sufficient to preempt state
law.83 The court in Holk did not reach the issue of whether the claims were
expressly preempted because Snapple waived its express preemption
argument.84 The court noted §343(k), regarding artificial flavoring, would
not expressly preempt state law because HFCS is a sweetener and not a
flavoring. Since the NLEA explicitly denies implied preemption based on
the NLEA, the court looked at other federal laws to determine whether the
claims were impliedly preempted. 86 The court's reasoning in Holk is flawed

Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1476 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
" Id. at 1033.
78 id.
" Id. at 1034.
s0Smith, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1476.
8 Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F. 3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 2009).
82Id. at 340.
1 Id. at 340-42.
7

76 Lockwood

84

Id. at 336.

" Id. at 336 n.3.
1 Id at 336.
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because the court only looked for the existence of an FDA regulation rather
than the level of FDA control over the regulation as discussed below.
2. Preemption with Defined Terms: Vitamin and Mineral Claims
Under §343(r)
Based on the Holk court's widely followed analysis, one would
assume courts would universally find that FDA defined terms are
preempted. However, Thomas Mason v. Coca-ColaCo. reached a different
result. In Thomas Mason v. Coca-Cola Co., the plaintiff claimed "Diet
Coke Plus" violated FDA regulations and was misleading because "Plus"
indicates an added amount of vitamins and minerals.87 The term "Plus" has
been precisely defined in FDA regulations." The court found that in order
to find implied conflict preemption, more than just a regulation defining the
term is necessary.89 The Thomas Mason v. Coca-Cola Co. decision shows
that even if the FDA defined the term "natural," it is not guaranteed that
state claims would be preempted. Therefore, predicting whether a state
claim will be preempted based on whether the term at issue has been
defined is still uncertain and should not be used as the method for resolving
preemption issues.
Considering the controversy regarding the scope of implied
preemption and the existence of the express preemption provision
applicable to food labeling laws, this note will analyze express preemption
under § 343-1. The express preemption analysis under the In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases is the most persuasive. In re Farm Raised Salmon
Cases was decided by the California Supreme Court, and the denial of
certification by the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that the In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases decision is the preferred method.90 However, the
analysis should also turn on the degree of FDA premarket approval and
FDA regulations following the procedure the U.S. Supreme Court used in
Riegel. Therefore, claims regarding food labels that are subject to
"rigorous" premarket approval should be preempted if the state claims are
based on the violation of a federal regulation or the state regulation is not
"identical" to the federal requirement.

87 Mason v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09-0220-NLH-JS, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65107, at *1-2
(D.N.J. 2010).
" Id. at *5 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.54(e)).
9
Id. at *12-13.
90 In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1097
(2009).
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IV. FOOD LABELING COMPARED TO MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION
ANALYSIS

Preemption analysis regarding food labeling should be determined
similarly to the recent preemption analysis used by the U.S. Supreme Court
for medical devices and prescription drugs because all three are regulated
by the FDCA. The California Supreme Court's decision in the In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases relied on the United States Supreme Court's plurality
opinion in Medtronic v. Lohr, which involved medical devices. 9 1 The Court
in Lohr held none of the plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted under
§ 360k(a), which states that no State may establish "any requirement that is
different from or in addition to, any requirement applicable under 21 USC
§ 301."92 Medical devices are divided into three classes depending upon
how dangerous they are to human life, with Class III being the most
dangerous. The different classes determine the different degrees of
premarket approval and compliance regulations.94 The Court in Lohr
determined the claims were not preempted because the FDA's premarket
"notification" process did not involve federal "requirements."9 5 Under the
premarket "notification" process in § 510(k) of the FDCA, medical devices
are allowed to be marketed if they are "substantially equivalent" to medical
devices in interstate commerce before May 28, 1976. Under the § 510(k)
premarket "notification" process, the review is completed in an average of
20 hours whereas medical devices requiring premarket approval undergo
around 1,200 hours of review.97 Despite the extensive approval process, the
FDA does not guarantee the safety of devices that pass the premarket
notification process. In premarket notification, the FDA only allows the
device to be marketed; it does not require the device to take any specific
form.99
In Riegel v. Medtronic, which involved medical devices, the U.S.
Supreme Court again determined whether state claims were expressly
preempted by the FDCA. In Riegel, the plaintiff was injured from a defect
in a Class III medical device that received premarket approval from the
FDA.100 The analysis the Court used in Riegel first determines whether

91In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1180-81.
92 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996) (citing Medical
Device Amendments of 1976
(MDA) to the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 21 U.S.C. §360k(a)).
93 Id. at 176-77.
94id.
9s Id. at

492-94.
Id. at 478.
9 Id. at 479.
98Id. at 479-80.
9 Id at 493-494.
' Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008).
9

6
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there is an applicable federal requirement.'0 1 In reaching that decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court found that the FDA's "rigorous" premarket approval
process imposes "requirements" under the FDCA.10 2 Premarket approval is
"focused on safety, not equivalence," and a device receiving premarket
approval must be made without deviations from the terms in its approval
application. 0 3 For a manufacturer to make changes affecting "safety or
effectiveness," the manufacturer must submit an application for
supplemental premarket approval, which is evaluated similarly to an initial
application.1'4 After devices receive premarket approval, they are subject to
reporting requirements and the FDA can withdraw its approval.'0 o The
Court next determined that Riegel's state common-law claims had
"requirements" that were "different from, or in addition to the federal ones"
and, therefore, were preempted.' 0 6 State tort law would require devices to
be safer but less effective, and a jury would not weigh the cost of a more
dangerous design versus the benefit to society. 07 The Court also noted that
a state's "requirements" includes its common-law duties.'os
The U.S. Supreme Court reached different conclusions about the
scope of federal preemption in Lohr and Riegel because of the different
degrees of the devices' premarket review.' 09 Lohr is still considered good
law, but the decision has been described as "fractured in an all but
irreconcilable manner," and the decision "did little to clear up the
confusion" of how broadly to apply the scope of federal preemption."o The
Riegel Court stated, "Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court
will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.""' The Court in
Riegel found Congress intended the term "requirements" referenced in the
FDCA to include a state's common-law duties.1 2 The dissent in Riegel
assumed that state tort suits regarding drugs and food and color additives
were not preempted, but the majority stated that this had not been
established." 3 The majority did mention that if Congress intended the
regimes to be treated similarly, then they would have made a preemption
clause applicable to the entire FDCA.1 14 These statements are extremely
1o1
102

Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2011).
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322.

103 Id.

at 323.

4 Id. at
105 Id.

319.

at 319-320.

' Id. at 328.
o0Id at 325.
os Id at 324.
' Id at 322-23.
1o In re Medtronic, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Minn. 2009) (quoting Goodlin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1371 (11 th Cir. 1999)).
..Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324.
112id.
"' Id. at 327.
11 Id. at 327.
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important for two reasons. First, a majority of the Supreme Court did not
automatically assume food-labeling laws were not preempted. Second, the
food labeling express preemption provision's application is intended to be
tailored specifically to the food-labeling regime because the analysis is
limited to the text of the statute. It is still important to consider how the
Supreme Court interpreted other preemption provisions under the FDCA.
The In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases decision citing Lohr was decided
before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Riegel. So the analysis from In re
Farm Raised Salmon Cases should incorporate the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in Riegel while maintaining the language and specific provisions in
the food labeling preemption provision.
A. ParallelClaim Exception
In Riegel, the Court left room for a plaintiff to allege a parallel
claim by allowing a state to provide "a damages remedy premised on a
violation of FDA regulations.""' Most of the other Circuits have held a
plaintiff must plead a "device-specific" violation of a federal
requirement.' 16 In Martin, the Fifth Circuit stated state common-law duties
that incorporate the premarket approval process were not preempted."' The
Sixth Circuit found that a claim based on a violation of the FDA's "Good
Manufacturing Practices," that has been incorporated into the premarket
approval process, was not preempted."' 8 Similarly, state claims based on a
violation of a federal food labeling regulation would not be preempted.
Since there is not a federal regulation concerning "natural" food products,
but rather an informal policy, the parallel claim exception does not apply to
false and misleading labeling claims regarding "Natural" food products.
V. FOOD LABELING COMPARED TO PRESCRIPTION DRUG LABELS IMPLIED

PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
In prescription drug cases, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
similar factors concerning the level of FDA approval and review of the
label to those used in medical devices during its preemption analysis.
" Id. at 330.
116See Ilarraza v. Medtronic, 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (acknowledging
a

minority view in a different case, and electing to follow the majority of the other courts); See also
Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (noting
that cases rejecting the minority view are "more persuasive with regard to the pleading standards of
Twombly").
" Martin v. Medtronic, 254 F.3d 573, 582 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001); But see In re Medtronic, 592
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff did not allege parallel claims because
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and Quality System Regulation (QSR) are "too generic, standing
alone to serve as the basis for Plaintiffs manufacturing-defects claims").
118Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App'x 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Congress declined to adopt an express preemption provision for
prescription devices when it adopted one for medical devices. 11 9 The Court
in Wyeth v. Levine used the lack of an express preemption provision as a
justification for failing to find preemption whereas the Court in PLIVA v.
Mensing found implied conflict preemption. 120 The Court in Wyeth held a
state law cause of action for failure to warn of the dangers of Phenergan
was not preempted by the FDA's approval of the label.121 Under the FDA
prescription drug approval process, the manufacturer must prove to the
FDA the drug is safe and effective.122 The Court found that simply
requiring the manufacturer to comply with an FDA approved label was not
enough to make compliance with both state and federal law impossible. 123
Manufacturers of prescription drugs have statutory authority from Congress
to unilaterally change their label without FDA consent after the label
receives initial approval. 12 4 However, manufacturers of medical devices
must have changes approved by the FDA, and without this approval,
manufacturers of medical devices may not deviate from the specifications

in the approval.12 5
In PLIVA v. Mensing, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the
issue of preemption concerning prescription drug labeling and found the
plaintiffs' claims to be preempted.12 6 The Court found preemption in PLIVA
even though the generic prescription was approved under a lesser
equivalency standard rather than being approved as a new drug.127 The
Court noted that Riegel and Lohr's analysis, which concluded that lower
premarket notification of an equivalent device was not a federal
requirement and premarket approval of a new device was a federal
requirement, was not persuasive because there is not an express preemption
provision for prescription drugs.1 2 8 In PLIVA, the state claims were
preempted because the manufacturers of the generic drug could not comply
with the state's stronger label requirements because the FDA required the
generic label to be the "same" as the brand-name drug label. 2 9 The Court
distinguished PLIVA from Wyeth because the manufacturers in PLIVA
could not independently act without the FDA's approval to comply with the

1 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567-69 (2009).
20

See id.; see also PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
"2 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
122Id. at 1195 (citing Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
781, 784 §§102(c) and 104(b) (1962)).
12 Id. at 1199.
1

124 id.

Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 319 (2008).
v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
121Id. at 2574.
128See Wyeth 129 S. Ct. at 1196; See also Living on the Point of the Spear, supra note 68
(discussing the differences between and implications of express and implied pre-emption).
29
1 PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577.
12'

126PLIVA
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state law duty.130 The Court stated that when deciding whether compliance
with both federal and state law is possible, if the private party cannot act
without the Federal Government's "special permission and assistance,
which is dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency," the
state claims are preempted because they are not the private parties'
independent action.131 The Court in Wyeth and PLIVA employed the same
analysis and asked what federal law permitted the manufacturer to do
independently, and then determined that the claim is not preempted if the
manufacturer could have complied with state law.' 32 While preemption
analysis under prescription drug labels differs from medical device and
food labeling preemption analysis, the level of FDA involvement and the
level of the manufacturer's control are still important considerations and
should be integrated into food labeling preemption analysis.
Implied preemption analysis is not limited to the words of the
statute because it derives its power from the Supremacy Clause.13 3
Therefore, implied preemption analysis from other areas of law is even
more relevant because "it is not statute specific." 3 4 This note proposes,
when considering food-labeling claims not covered by the express
preemption provision, courts should follow the analysis used in PLIVA and
Wyeth to determine implied preemption. The focus of implied preemption
analysis from PLIVA and Wyeth is the level of the manufacturer's control
and its ability to unilaterally make changes after premarket approval.
VI. EXPRESS PREEMPTION ANALYSIS: PREMARKET APPROVAL AND FDA
REGULATIONS REGARDING FOOD LABELING

The NLEA contains an express preemption provision regarding
food labeling, unlike prescription drugs.13 5 The express preemption
provision applies only to the specific sections listed under § 343-1, such as
general nutrition information under § 343(q); artificial coloring, artificial
flavoring, or chemical preservatives under § 343(k); and nutrition level and
health related claims under § 343(r). To determine whether state claims are
expressly preempted under § 343-1, courts should perform a two-step
analysis similar to the one the Supreme Court used in Riegel. First, courts
should determine whether a federal "requirement" exists based on the level
of premarket approval and FDA regulations. Courts should determine
whether the level of FDA review is more similar to premarket notification
in Lohr, which does not guarantee safety, or whether it is more like the

co ld. at 2581.

Id
See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198; See also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
133
Living on the Pointof the Spear,supra note 68.
134
Gdd
131

132

13 Turek v. Gen. Mills, 754 F. Supp. 2d 956, 958
(E.D. Ill. 2010).
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"rigorous" premarket approval in Riegel, which does not allow individuals
to unilaterally change the specifications in the application without the
FDA's consent. In making this decision, courts should analyze different
factors including the extent of FDA premarket approval, specific versus
generic regulations, whether the FDA guarantees safety, and the
manufacturer's level of unilateral control over changes in labeling after
premarket approval. Second, courts should analyze whether the state
requirement is "identical" to the federal requirement.
A. FoodLabeling Generally
The FDA does not approve manufacturers, but they are inspected
and subjected to "Good Manufacturing Practices."' 3 6 Food labeling in
general is not subject to premarket approval.137 The FDA's general food
labeling requirements concerning the contents of a label, where its placed,
the font, size, etc. are considered "nonbinding recommendations." 3 There
are FDA regulations that are enforced, such as one that requires that food
product claims are not false or misleading.139 Food labels for prepared
foods including bread, cereal, canned and frozen food, snacks, deserts,
drinks, and the like are required, whereas nutrition labeling for raw produce
such as fruits, vegetables, and raw fish is voluntary.140 FDA regulation 21
CFR § 101.9 requires nutrition information for all food products unless
there is an exception. Nutrient and food components' quantities must also
be disclosed.141 Furthermore, nutrition information declared on the label
must be either the mandatory or voluntary nutrients or food components
listed under 21 CFR § 101.9.
General food labeling claims that are not subject to premarket
approval, and are only required to comply with general regulations, would
not be considered a federal "requirement" under Lohr. The Court in Lohr
found manufacturing and labeling requirements that are "entirely generic,"
and concern device regulation as a whole, did not preempt common-law
claims, and differed from premarket approval because premarket approval
is specific to individual devices.14 2 Food labeling is not generally subject to
"6 Is it Really FDA Approved?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm047470.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2009).
137Id.
13sGeneralFood Labeling Requirements, Guidancefor Industry: A FoodLabeling Guide, U.S.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Oct. 2009) http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryinformation/
GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuide/ucm64866.htn.
39
' 1s it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
1o Labeling & Nutrition: Food Labeling and Nutrition Overview, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/food/labelingnutrition/default.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2012).
14'21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2012).
142 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 323-24 (2008) (citing Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 503-5, 521 (1996)).
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premarket approval, and the regulations requiring that the labels are not
false or misleading and contain nutrient information are similar to the
"generic" regulations in Lohr. The "generic" regulations in Lohr included a
"listing of the devices, good manufacturing practices, labeling, and the
misbranding and adulterations provisions of the Act."1 43 Also, the
"substantial equivalence" letter, expressly stating that the FDA was not
officially approving the device, was considered a "generic" regulation.'44
Without an FDA regulation defining the term "natural," the current
"natural" food label informal policy would probably be considered a
"generic" regulation because it is not enforced and the FDA does not
guarantee its safety.14 5 Without an FDA regulation, the term "natural" is not
required to be in a specific form similar to the device received premarket
notification in Lohr. Products claiming to be "natural" do not receive as
much premarket review as the medical device in Lohr because
manufacturers do not even have to notify the FDA of the use of the term.146
Therefore, claims based on general food labeling regulations, including the
"natural" food label informal policy, are not federal "requirements." Under
the proposed analysis finding there is not a federal "requirement," claims
that food products are not "natural," are not expressly preempted under
current FDA regulations.
B. Health Claims
Health claims describe the relationship between a substance,
including a food, food component, or dietary ingredient, and its effect on
reducing the "risk of a disease or health-related condition." 47 Health claims
are subject to FDA review and approval through regulations contained in
the NLEA including § 343(r)(1)(B). 14 8 The 1997 Food and Drug
Administration Act allows health claims to be based on a statement from
the U.S. Government or National Academy of Sciences, and the 2003 FDA
Consumer Health Information for Better Nutrition Initiative mandates
specific quality and strength standards for the scientific evidence in order to
receive FDA approval.149 An example of a health claim that is authorized
by an FDA regulation under the NLEA is the claim that "diets high in
calcium may reduce the risk of osteoporosis."so Qualified health claims
may be used if the scientific evidence is not established, but the qualified
'4 3Lohr, 518 U. S.at 493.
1 Id.
145
FOOD LABELING CHAOS, supra note 1.
146Is it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
" Claims that Can be Madefor ConventionalFoods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD &

DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2003), http://www.fda.gov/food/labelingnutrition/labelclaims/ucml 11447.htm.
148 id

149id.
150Id.
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claim must contain limiting language.'5 Health claims are regulated under
§ 343(r), to which the express preemption provision, § 343-1 specifically
applies.152
Approved health claims subjected to FDA review would be
considered federal "requirements" under Riegel. The FDA performs an
"extensive review of scientific literature" when authorizing the claims and
there are specific FDA regulations under § 343(r). 15 3 Also, the express
preemption provision applies specifically to § 343(r).15 4
Qualified health claims generally undergo a process including an
initial file review, opportunity for public comment, scientific review, and a
regulatory decision.' Qualified claims may be used on any food product
meeting the specifications in the approval letter, and therefore, are more
similar to the "substantially equivalent" standard used in the premarket
notification process in Lohr.'16 Since each individual qualified health claim
may not be reviewed and approved by the FDA, qualified health claims
would not be considered federal "requirements." In summary, approved
health claims are likely to be considered federal "requirements" and would
preempt state claims, but qualified health claims would not be considered
federal "requirements."
C. Structure-FunctionClaims
A structure-function claim states the benefit that the food or food
component will provide to the human body.15 7 An example of a structurefunction claim is "calcium builds strong bones." 58 Structure-function
claims on dietary supplement labels must notify the FDA within thirty days
of marketing the dietary supplement and must state a disclaimer that the
FDA has not reviewed the claim.'59 General food manufacturers do not
have to notify the FDA of their structure-function claims.16 0 Structurefunction claims are not regulated by the FDA and are one of the "most
deceptive" claims used today.' 6' Since structure-function claims are not
131Id.

U.S.C.A. § 343(r) (West 2012); 21 U.S.C.A. § 343-1 (West 2012).
.s.
21 U.S.C.A. § 343(r) (West 2012); Is it Really FDA Approved?, supranote 135.
14 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 343-1 (West 2012).
1s5 Guidancefor Industry: Interim Proceduresfor QualifiedHealth Claims in the Labeling of
Conventional Human Food and Human Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jul. 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabeli
ngNutrition/ucm053832.htm.
156 Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996); Is it Really FDA Approved?, supra
note 135.
Is57I
it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
1 Id.
15221

15eId
161

L
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regulated, they would not be found to be a federal "requirement" under
Lohr so state claims would not be preempted.
D. Nutrient Content Claims
Nutrient content claims "characterize the level of a nutrient in a
food" using terms such as "free, high, or low," or they compare the nutrient
levels to other foods by saying "more, reduced, and light."1 62 The term
"healthy" is also considered a nutrient content claim and can only be made
if it meets the definition in the regulation. 63 A claim stating "only 200 mg
of sodium" is also considered a nutrient content claim because it
characterizes the sodium level as being "low."'" Nutrient content claims
are subject to a premarket approval process and extensive FDA regulations
defining commonly used terms.16 5 Under § 343(r), a food is misbranded if
"a claim is made in the label or labeling of the food which expressly or by
implication characterizes the level of any nutrient" unless "the
characterization of the level made in the claim uses terms which are defined
in regulations." Nutrient content claims are regulated under § 343(r)(1)(A),
to which the express preemption provision, § 343-l(a)(5), specifically

applies.166
Nutrient content claims would be considered federal
"requirements" because of the premarket approval process and extensive
FDA regulations. If the FDA made a regulation defining the term "natural,"
it would likely be considered a voluntary nutrient content claim.167 As a
nutrient content claim, "natural" would be a federal "requirement" under
Riegel and state requirements that are not identical would be preempted.
E. FoodAdditives Claims
Under 21 USC § 321(s) of the FDCA, a food additive is "any
substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise
affecting the characteristics of any food." Food additive claims may be
preempted if they are an artificial flavoring or chemical preservative under
§ 343-l(a)(3) and if state claims are not identical to § 343(k).168 The FDA
specifies the conditions for the approval of food additives in regulations

162

U.S.C. §343-1 (2010).
13, at 415.
'621 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3) (2010).

166 21

167See Farris,supra note
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published in the Federal Register."' New food additives are subject to
premarket approval, and the manufacturers have the burden to prove that
the additives are safe. 170 FDA experts review the safety results to ensure
"the additive is safe for its intended use."l 7 ' In addition to premarket
approval, FDA field investigators inspect food companies and collect
samples; laboratory scientists analyze the samples; and compliance officers
follow through on enforcement of legal issues.172 Even substances not
intended to be added to food, but "migrate" to food, are considered new
food additives and are subject to safety review.17 3 Existing food additives
with a history of safety, referred to as Generally Recognized as Safe
(GRAS) substances, are not subject to premarket approval.1 74
Regulations concerning new food additives are subject to premarket
approval and would therefore be considered a federal "requirement" under
Riegel.175 Similar to the "rigorous" premarket approval in Riegel, the
premarket approval of food additives is reviewed by FDA examiners to
ensure safety and compliance with the regulations and is enforced.176
Premarket approval of food additives can require toxicology review,
chemistry review, and environmental review, and toxicology review alone
can take up to 4,500 hours.17 7 The court considered premarket approval for
medical devices a federal "requirement" when it required 1,200 hours of
review. 17 Additionally, food additive labels must comply with the
specifications in the approved application so the manufacturer does not
have unilateral control over changes to the label.'
Food additive
regulations are a federal "requirement" because of the large extent of
premarket approval ensuring the safety of the food product, and therefore,
they preempt state law causes of action.
GRAS substances are not subject to premarket approval, but the
application requires the same amount of information as new food
additives. 80 The GRAS notification program is voluntary and the FDA

169Antonia Mattia & Robert Merker, Regulation of ProbioticSubstances as Ingredients
in
Foods: Premarket Approval or "Generally Recognized as Safe" Notification (U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., College Park, MD), 2008, available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/
health/events/probiotics/documents/mattiamerker.pdf.
17oS it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
172

Id

73

Id.

75

Id

1
1

176Mattia

& Merker, supra note 168.

1' See RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST. CTR. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, RESOURCE EVALUATION OF
THE FDA FOOD ADDITIVE PETITION PROCESS (Jul. 1998) [herein after RESOURCE EVALUATION],

availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/food.pdf.
1' See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,474 (1996).
"' Is it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
180RESOURCE EVALUATION, supra note 176.

2012-2013]

NATURALLY CONFUSING CONSUMERS

139

does not make the safety decision.' The manufacturer makes the safety
decision instead of the FDA, causing it to be similar to the premarket
notification in Lohr, which does not guarantee safety.182 Since the program
is voluntary and not subject to premarket approval, GRAS substance
regulations would not be considered a federal "requirement" and thus
federal law preempts state law claims. 83
F. Color Additive Claims
Color additive claims could also be expressly preempted by

§ 343(k) if they claim that a food product contains artificial coloring. Color
additives are subject to premarket approval, and "must be used in
compliance with its approved uses, specifications, and restrictions." 84
During the approval process, the FDA evaluates the safety of the food.'
There are multiple FDA regulations concerning disclosure of color
additives. Under the FDCA, a food is misbranded "if it bears or contains
any.. .artificial coloring.. .unless it's labeling states that fact." The use of
a color additive must be disclosed through phrases such as "artificial color,"
"artificial color added," or "color added," and the disclosure must be
located on the food, its container, or on its wrapper. 18 Food ingredients are
considered a color additive under 21 U.S.C. § 70.3(f) if the "customary or
reasonably foreseeable" expected result is to transplant color, and the food
ingredient was "deliberately used as a color." 8 8 Color additives do not have
a GRAS exception, and therefore, all color additives are subject to
premarket approval unless they are "used solely for a purpose other than
coloring." 89 The improper use of a listed color additive or use of an
unlisted color additive can cause a product to be considered adulterated, and
the FDA can take enforcement action against adulterated products.' 90
Color additive regulations concerning "artificial coloring" would be
considered a federal "requirement" because they are subject to premarket
approval and must comply with the specifications in the application. 9 ' At
least ten analyses are performed on a color additive sample submitted to the
Id.
See generallyLohr, 518 U.S. 470.
18 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2011).
184 Julie N. Barrows et al., Color Additives: FDA's Regulatory
Process and Historical
Perspectives, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Forlndustry/ColorAdditives/
RegulatoryProcessHistoricalPerspectives/default.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2009).
185Mattia & Merker, supranote 168 at S116.
186In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. §
343(k) (2011)).
87
1 Id. at 1174-75 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 101.22(k)(2),(c) (2011)).
18821 C.F.R. §70.3(f) (2012).
189Barrows et al., supra note 183.
1Id.
191Is it Really FDA Approved?, supra note 135.
181
182
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FDA for premarket approval.19 2 The premarket approval process ensures the
food product is safe, and there are also more specific FDA regulations.193
Color additive claims that include artificial coloring would likely be
considered a federal "requirement" under Riegel and would be expressly
preempted.
VII. LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER CONFUSION OF FOOD PRODUCT LABELS

Whether consumers actually rely on claims made on the label
influences the outcome of the lawsuits. A recent study by the FDA found,
when purchasing a food product for the first time, 54% of consumers claim
they read the food label, and 91% of consumers are cognizant of the
connection between proper nutrition and the risk of diet-related disease.194
However, consumers are more skeptical of Nutrient Content Claims with
56% believing that "some or none of them are accurate."' 95
Consumers' skepticism is most likely caused by the current FDA
regulations that are out of date and not enforced.' 96 Despite the fact that
premarket approval is required by the NLEA for Health Claims, the FDA
"essentially adopted a policy of non-enforcement" during the Bush
Administration.197 Premarket approval for Nutrient Content Claims has not
kept up with recent scientific developments, and the regulations need to be
updated.' 98 In 2009, even the FDA Commissioner stated the food labels are
essential to aiding consumers' healthy nutrition but regulations have not
been "substantially addressed" since the NLEA was enacted.199 The Center
for Science in the Public Interest recommends the FDA implement
regulations prohibiting structure-function claims, require general food
labeling claims such as those stating "made with whole wheat" to also
describe the percent of the claim, and define the term "natural" through
regulation.200 If the FDA improves its regulations and premarket approval
processes, more of the food labeling claims discussed above should be
found to be preempted by federal law through the recommended two-step
approach.

192Barrows

et al., supra note 183.
Is it Really FDA Approved?, supranote 135.
'19 Survey Shows Gains in Food-Label Use, Health/Diet Awareness, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm202611.htm.
19

1 Id.
96FOOD LABELING CHAOS, supra note 1, at I-3, 1-4.
' Id. at 1-4.
9

9 Id. at 1-2.
20 Id at vii.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
To determine express preemption, courts should apply the two-step
approach similar to the U.S. Supreme Court analysis in Riegel. Courts
should first determine whether a food labeling regulation is a federal
"requirement," and should then determine whether the state claim is
identical to the federal "requirement." In determining whether an FDA
regulation is a federal "requirement," courts should consider the level of
premarket approval employed by the FDA. Without a clear definition of the
term "natural" or an official policy by the FDA, it is likely that "natural"
food labels will be considered a general food-labeling claim that does not
impose a federal "requirement." Therefore, claims alleging that a food
product label is false and misleading because it is not "natural," such as the
claims alleged against Kellogg's Kashi brand, would not be expressly
preempted under the recommended two-step approach. Furthermore,
federal law should not preempt state claims regarding general food labeling
and structure-function. If the state law does not impose identical
requirements to federal law, federal law should preempt health claims,
nutrient content claims, color additive claims based on artificial color, and
food additive claims based on artificial flavoring and chemical
preservatives. This recommended approach will provide consistency for
courts when analyzing whether state claims of a false and misleading food
label are preempted by the FDCA.

